We also distinguish between expected and unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005b), with the

former, often called risk in economics and neuroeconomics (Glimcher, 2010), quantifying what is known not to be known within the current conception of the organism’s circumstance, and the latter capturing what lies outside these bounds—crudely, radical, unpredicted, changes indicating substantial failings in this current conception, and sharing some this website features with economics’ notion of ambiguity. The original communication issues that neuromodulators address also apply to uncertainty. For instance, it is clear that if unexpected uncertainty leads to the need for a dramatic revision of current computations, then many neural systems will need to know this fact. Equally, as we will see, expected uncertainty should control plasticity, and there are reasons to seek a tag which might label the sort of uncertainty involved. Finally, uncertainty regulates the way that different sources of information should be combined; this is a form of systemic adaptation of structurally fixed

connections. There is evidence that the neuromodulators acetylcholine and norepinephrine play confined, but critical roles in both forms of uncertainty; with phasic and tonic delivery potentially distinguishing Apoptosis Compound Library between inference and learning (Bouret and Sara, 2005; Dayan and Yu, 2006). Uncertainty will first be considered in the context of learning, and then of inference. Most of the computational

models are Bayesian, or at least approximately Bayesian, in character. The only reason to learn is because of ignorance. In (Bayesian) statistical terms, ignorance is quantified by uncertainty, which is why uncertainty should control aspects of the nature and course of learning. Autoassociative memory provides a first example; then conditioning, which involves richer forms of (-)-p-Bromotetramisole Oxalate expected uncertainty; and finally issues of unexpected uncertainty induced by change are discussed. One case of the link between ignorance and learning arises in the context of auto-associative memory models of the hippocampus (Hasselmo, 2006; Hasselmo and Bower, 1993). Here, the idea is that an input should be assessed to see how familiar it is. If it is deemed novel, (i.e., the subject is suitably ignorant of it), it should be stored; if the input is familiar, then recall processes should remove noise from it and/or recall relevant context or associated information. Thus, on top of the assessment of familiarity, there are two implementational requirements for an input deemed to be novel: preventing attempts at recall from corrupting it and plasticizing appropriate synapses to store it.